3 Reasons Pennsylvania Turned Blue
It looks that pending two undecided races, Democrats will — on top of historic victories in the gubernatorial and United States Senate races — take control of the Pennsylvania House for the first time since 2010.
The election results are a surprise. Even with Josh Shapiro comfortably cruising to an election victory, polling showed a narrowing race between John Fetterman and Dr. Mehmet Oz, and control of the House seemed out of reach even if Democrats were expected to pick up seats.
So what’s the story of Pennsylvania’s election? Spoiler: it’s not, as Matt Yglesias thinks, that “moderation wins.” Here’s three quick key narratives.
1. A Sixty-Seven County Strategy
John Fetterman has touted campaigning in every corner of Pennsylvania dating back to his failed Senate primary bid against Katie McGinty in 2016, and it — along with Josh Shapiro buying into the same strategy — paid off.
Philadelphia Inquirer analysis showed both Fetterman and Shapiro outperforming Joe Biden in almost every county of Pennsylvania, with particularly large swings in western Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania’s so-called “T” — the region that powered Donald Trump to an upset win in 2016, and which has been traditionally written off by Democratic campaigns.
James Carville — one of the big backers of Conor Lamb’s failed Senate bid — notoriously (and stupidly) referred to Pennsylvania as “Alabama in the middle,” and too many Democrats have taken that to heart. Strategically ignoring that was particularly critical given low turnout in Philadelphia and Delaware County.
Ignoring Carville’s nonsense mattered for two key reasons:
In John Fetterman’s case, there’s good reason to surmise his long history of campaigning in areas often neglected by statewide candidates helped insulate him from relentless attack ads and a media onslaught largely absent from the gubernatorial race.
Only two counties had lower turnout in 2022 than 2018: Philadelphia, and Delaware. Every other county had significantly boosted turnout, and surprisingly, that turnout bolstered Democrats. Without clawing back ground elsewhere throughout the state, uncharacteristically low Philadelphia turnout could have sunk Fetterman and significantly narrowed Shapiro’s margin of victory.
2. Strong Downballot Candidates
With (mostly) fair legislative maps following redistricting — the result of an eight year plan to ensure Republicans, who gerrymandered the shit out of the state, didn’t control the process — Democrats were anticipated to make gains in both chambers, with most coming in the House. The potential to make gains in the House meant large-scale investment in lower level legislative races, which (when used well) may have helped drive Democratic performance.
Using the example of HD-82 in State College — a newly created, competitive Lean D District with no incumbent — a strong ground game helped the campaign overperform the District’s anticipated DPI by between 4-5 points, cruising to a comfortable victory with over 56% of the vote. Anecdotally, HD-82 wasn’t alone as an example of smart local campaigns driving strong Democratic performance.
There’s good reason to believe that downballot investment is a neglected and critical component of winning up and down the ticket. In contrast to centralized, top-of-ticket campaign infrastructures, investing in local campaigns means resourcing campaigns more familiar with the terrain, and with deeper local connections in the community.
3. Organized Labor
Unions showed up, and showed up big, driven in part by enthusiasm for aggressively pro-union messaging touted by John Fetterman’s Senate campaign, as well as the threat of right-to-work and attacks on public sector union rights in the gubernatorial race.
Organized labor provided financial support for candidates and critical ground game through member-to-member mobilization, turning out the labor vote in support of endorsed candidates. This is particularly critical to any effort to compete in all sixty-seven counties: in many areas, labor provides infrastructure for voter contact and mobilization that surpasses that of local Democratic clubs and county parties, along with more effectiveness as a messenger. Central Labor Councils, like Allegheny-Fayette Central Labor Council, proved to be critical quarterbacks for running mobilization programs throughout the state.
Labor also backed independent expenditure operations to contact and turn out the wider electorate. Although there’s no full accounting of the scale of the effort — which I’ll leave to someone inclined to go through FEC reports — labor-affiliated independent expenditure committees like For Our Future, Working America, and Workers Vote (the Super PAC affiliated with UNITE HERE) provided significant resources in both bought media and on-the-ground voter contact efforts.
Key Takeaway
The key takeaway: you need to compete in every county in Pennsylvania to win.
This should’ve been obvious in the wake of the 2016 election after Democratic disinvestment in competing outside of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and their suburbs cost Hillary Clinton both the state and the presidency. Although subsequent statewide campaigns, including Joe Biden’s presidential campaign, corrected for that error, the 2022 election was the first to feature a concerted, statewide effort to compete even in Republican strongholds.
That made a difference, and Democratic improvement even in counties that Republicans won gave a critical cushion for statewide races. Without a strong ground game throughout Pennsylvania, low Philadelphia turnout may have turned election night into a grim affair for Pennsylvania Democrats. Without Josh Shapiro running up the score on Doug Mastriano, it’s entirely plausible he would have refused to concede — something he only begrudgingly offered after several days delay, despite his overwhelming loss.
Final Thought
I wrote a piece for The Baffler last month on just how insane Doug Mastriano is. Read it, thank God he didn’t win, and hope that he doesn’t cause too much damage in the remainder of his tenure as a State Senator.